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C entr al  As i a
VL AD M I R  B O B R O V N I K O V
The vision of Islam as it is practised in the post-so-
cialist context is very confused at the moment. It is
associated either with Ôthe revival of local pre-mod-
ern traditionsÕ and thus with the localization of post-
socialist Muslim space, or with Ôthe spread of Is-
lamism absolutely alien to local Muslim traditionsÕ,
introduced to countries of the former socialist bloc
from abroad and fraught with their Islamist global-
ization. Post-socialist forms of Islam are often
thought of as an ÔIslamic threatÕ opposing all non-
Muslim cultures.
P o s t - S o c i a l i s t
Forms of Islam
Caucasian Wahhabis
The so-called ÔWahhabiÕ movement in the
North Caucasus offers particular insight into
what Islam has come to mean in this post-
socialist era. Its relevance becomes even
more clear when discussing the main prob-
lems of post-socialist Muslim societies, in-
cluding the impact of the socialist and pre-
socialist legacies on modern forms of Islam,
new divisions of the contemporary Muslim
space, and the politicization and radicaliza-
tion of the Islamist movement.The Wah-
habis are dissident Muslim congregations
that emerged in the Northern Caucasus in
the late socialist period. Their i m a m s a p p e a l
to the Ôpurification of IslamÕ from Ônon-per-
mitted innovationsÕ (b i d ac), including d h i k r,
pilgrimages to saint shrines (z i y a r a t) ,
m a w l i d celebrations, recitations of the
QurÕan in cemeteries (t a l q i n), and the use of
protective charms (s a b a b). They regard the
QurÕan and the Sunna as the only sources of
faith (d i n). Sufi s h a y k h s are particularly tar-
geted by the WahhabisÕ assaults. Criticizing
them for their cooperation with post-social-
ist authorities, the Wahhabis accuse these
ÔtariqatistsÕ of selling their religion to the Ôin-
fidelÕ (k u f f a r) government.
The Wahhabis have even challenged the
other North Caucasian Muslims by their
dress. Their men have beards without mous-
taches and wear short trousers. Some Wah-
habi women are veiled by a k h i m a r or a h i j a b
and sometimes by a n i q a b. The followers of
the movement call themselves ÔMuslimsÕ or
ÔbrothersÕ (i k h w a n) and consider their con-
gregations as the only communities of the
faithful (j a m aca t). They are also known as
s a l a f s, making reference to the first follow-
ers of Prophet Mohammed whose way of
life they claim to imitate. The movement
was named ÔWahhabiÕ by its opponents
amongst the followers of local Sufi s h a y k h s.
This term was invented after the name of
Mohammed b. cA b d al-Wahhab, a reformer
of Islam in the 18t h century. In the Northern
Caucasus, it has a derogatory and negative
c o n n o t a t i o n .
Soviet roots of the Wahhabis
The foundation of Wahhabi congrega-
tions in the Northern Caucasus is usually as-
sociated with the fall of the socialist regime
in 1991. In reality, they date back to the mid-
1970s, when proselytizing Muslim groups
arose in dozens of Dagestani and Chechen
villages situated in the Terek-Sulak low-
lands. Their members secretly gathered in
houses of local Muslim scholars (cu l a ma')
while attending their Arabic and QurÕanic
classes. Such unlicensed schools also carried
out missionary work (dacw a) among the vil-
lage youth. Fearing the spread of Islamism
from Iran and Afghanistan, the Soviet au-
thorities closed down all unauthorized Is-
lamic schools by the beginning of the 1980s.
However, in the 1990s some of the teachers,
such as Bagauddin Kebedov (b. in 1945),
from the village of Pervomayskoe, and
Ahmad-qadi Akhtaev (1942-1998), from the
village of Kudali, became renowned Wah-
habi a m i r s. Initially, they sided with Naqsh-
bandi s h a y k h s who had instructed them in
Arabic and usul al-din.
It should also be mentioned that the
North Caucasian Wahhabis emerged in a
context of, though in reaction to, anti-Islam-
ic socialist reforms. Their movement arose
in lowland districts of Dagestan and Chech-
nya where collectivization, resettlement
and Ôcultural revolutionÕ campaigns were
successfully carried out from the 1930s-
1970s. About two-thirds of highlanders had
resettled there. For instance, Bagauddin
KebedovÕs parents had moved from their
native Dagestani village of Sasitli to Vedeno
in Chechnya following the deportation of
the Chechens in 1944, and in 1957 resettled
in the village of Pervomayskoe in Dagestan.
Closed Muslim communities had been
formed within collective and state farms in
the lowlands and these became the cradle
of the ÔIslamic revivalÕ movement that arose
in the latter years of perestroika.
Under socialist rule, many pre-revolution-
ary cu l a m a ' were persecuted and most of the
Sufi intellectual practices faded away. Both
Wahhabis and followers of Dagestani and
Chechen Sufi s h a y k h s shared a secular so-
cialist mentality. The impact of the Soviet
ideology can be observed down to the very
title of the Wahhabi programme, passed in
January 1998, called the ÔManifesto of J a-
m aca t of DagestanÕ after the famous Com-
munist Manifesto.
Redividing Muslim space
The wave of Islamic enthusiasm, which
seized Dagestan and other Muslim republics
of the Northern Caucasus at the end of the
1980s, divided the regionÕs Muslim society
into ÔWahhabisÕ and ÔTraditionalistsÕ. This
schism replaced a traditional cleavage of
Muslim space into S h ici t e s (Azerbaijan and
Southern Dagestan) and Sunnites (Northern
Caucasus). Under socialist rule, confronta-
tions which had taken place between Cau-
casian S h ici t e s and Sunnites from the Safaw-
id expansion of the 16t h- 1 8t h centuries to the
early 20t h century died out. At present, the
former S h ici t e places of worship, such as Fri-
day j u m a-mosques in the Dagestani towns
of Derbent and Kizlyar, are attended by
S h ici t e s and Sunnites alike. At the same time,
another pre-modern division of the Sunnite
Muslims into followers of the S h a f ici t e l e g a l
school, which had traditionally dominated
in Dagestan and Checheno-Ingushetia, and
the Hanifite m a d h h a b prevailing in the
North-Western Caucasus, disappeared.
A new fundamental division of the North
Caucasian Muslims has an important politi-
cal dimension associated with the disinte-
gration of the central power as it occurred in
post-socialist Russia. Following the fall of
the socialist regime, the Spiritual Board of
the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, dat-
ing back to 1943, broke up into several inde-
pendent republican branches. In turn, some
of them split into small ethnic branches.
Though legalized by the North Caucasian
republican authorities and incorporated
into the post-socialist political system, these
m u f t i y a t s have failed to gain the support of
all the restored Muslim congregations. The
number of unauthorized Friday mosques
grew rapidly, as did the new congregations
independent from the officially recognized
Muslim clergy: only 212 of 1585 restored
Dagestani mosques sided with the republi-
can m u f t i y a t by May 2000.
Dagestan and Chechnya witnessed the
appearance of the Islamist counterparts of
the official Muslim clergy Ð the Wahhabis.
From the lowlands, their influence first
spread to the highland villages of both re-
publics. By the mid-1990s, their congrega-
tions, although small in size, emerged in In-
gushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardi-
no-Balkaria, StavropolÕe and even in the
Dagestani migrant community in Astrahan.
Before the beginning of the first Russian-
Chechen war (1994-1996), the Wahhabis
concentrated on their missionary work
(d acw a) by imparting QurÕanic education
and literature on basic Islamic practices
such as BagauddinÕs book, N a m a z ( P r a y e r ) .
This work had been reprinted in hundreds
of thousands of copies in 1993, 1994 and
1999. Until 1998, the centre of the move-
ment was located in the Dagestani town of
Kizilyurt, where the largest Wahhabi
m a d r a s a, al-Hikma, comprising more than
700 pupils, had been set up by Bagauddin
Kebedov in December 1991. By the mid-
1990s, some Wahhabi congregations estab-
lished close contacts with the missionary
centres and foundations from abroad in-
cluding Tayba, al-Haramain, and al-Igasa al-
Islamiyya, which began to sponsor their ed-
ucational and publishing activities.
Radicalization of Islam
From 1994-1998, a number of armed con-
flicts occurred between Wahhabi and Sufi
factions in the towns and villages of Dages-
tan and Chechnya. Since the mid-1990s, the
Wahhabis have been subjected to systemat-
ic repression by the local official Muslim
clergy. Gradually, outbreaks of fighting
within village and town communities were
reproduced at the level of the republic and
subsequently expanded to the regional
level. Thus from 1997-1999 the Wahhabi j a-
m aca t of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, Kadar
and Durangi villages expelled representa-
tives of the Dagestani authorities and pro-
claimed Ôa separate Islamic territory gov-
erned by the S h a r icaÕ (or the so-called Kadar
zone). By 1998, the initiative in this struggle
was captured by ÔTraditionalistsÕ. The official
Muslim clergy lobbied for a new federal reli-
gion bill and a Dagestani version was
passed in Moscow and Makhachkala in Sep-
tember-December 1997. Wahhabi congre-
gations and other Ônon-traditional confes-
sionsÕ were to be officially registered.
In December 1997, Bagauddin Kebedov
had to leave Kizilyurt for Urus-Martan in
Chechnya. This exile and the ensuing death
of Ahmad-qadi Akhtaev in March 1998, re-
sulted in a rapid politicization and radical-
ization of the movement. There had always
been a political dimension, but its form and
programmes now changed. While Khasbu-
lat KhasbulatovÕs ÔJ a m aca t a l - M u s l i m i n Õ ,
Kebedov and AkhtaevÕs Islamic Revival Party
and AkhtaevÕs Ôal-IslamiyyaÕ movement had
been founded in the period from 1989-1996
to represent the North Caucasian Muslims
to the Russian state authorities and to
spread Islamic knowledge among the North
Caucasian highlanders, ÔIslamic J a m aca tÕ, es-
tablished by Bagauddin Kebedov in 1998,
announced a holy war (al-jihad al-asgar) .
This war was to be waged against the Ôunbe-
lieving secular governmentÕ of Dagestan
and for the establishment of an ÔIslamic
caliphate in the CaucasusÕ. Supported by
Chechen field commanders, the Wahhabi
leaders organized ÔIslamic peace-making
troopsÕ. Some famous terrorists such as cA b d
al-Rahman ibn al-Hattab, originating from
the Chechen diaspora in Jordan, and Shamil
Basaev entered the movement. The former
Chechen m u f t i Kadyrov, siding with the ÔTra-
ditionalistsÕ, formed a ÔtariqatistÕ regiment
that actively fought with the Wahhabis.
From 1999-2001, the Wahhabis based in
Chechnya and Dagestan were involved in
the second Russian-Chechen war, which
started with a raid by military Wahhabi
groups in northern Dagestan. Federal forces
rapidly defeated their troops and destroyed
villages of the Kadar zone, but failed to abol-
ish the movement whose leaders escaped
to Chechnyan territory. They are still active
in the underground, functioning simultane-
ously Ôeverywhere and nowhereÕ (cf. M.
Gilsenan). Paradoxically, the militant Is-
lamist ideas and practices are shared by
both Wahhabis and their religious and secu-
lar adversaries. Such enigmatic and destruc-
tive tendencies in modern North Caucasian
forms of Islam deserve greater attention in
research on the process of re-Islamization in
the post-socialist context. u
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